A distributed proof system is an effective way for deriving useful information by combining data from knowledge bases managed by multiple different principals across different administrative domains. As such, many researchers have proposed using these types of systems as a foundation for distributed authorization and trust management in decentralized systems. However, to account for the potentially sensitive nature of the underlying information, it is important that such proof systems be able to protect the confidentiality of the logical facts and statements.
INTRODUCTION
Computer systems that span multiple administrative domains are increasingly interdependent, both in the context of virtual business coalitions and in pervasive computing systems. A distributed proof system is an effective way to combine information held by different principals spanning these domains. Many researchers have proposed using these techniques as a foundation for distributed authorization and trust management systems [1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 13] .
Such distributed proof systems can combine information across disparate administrative domains, and thus must provide a means of controlling the flow of sensitive information between these domains. However, as some underlying data may be sensitive, it is important to enforce confidentiality policies to control control which principals are allowed to make use of confidential information stored within any principal's knowledge base. For example, in virtual business coalitions, organizational attributes are frequently sensitive and should be revealed only to trusted parties.
Despite the obvious importance of confidentiality, it is not modeled explicitly by most distributed proof construction systems. Rather, there is an implicit assumption that all principals will enforce their confidentiality policies by controlling what is directly revealed in two-party interactions among principals. In particular, inferences that may be made based on the external state of a system are not explicitly modeled. Consider an example proof system with three principals p0, p1, and p2 with the following knowledge bases respectively.
1
KB 0 = {f0}, KB 1 = {f1 ← p0 says f0} KB 2 = {f2 ← p1 says f1}.
Suppose principal p0 is willing to reveal fact f0 to p1 but not p2. With pairwise policy enforcement, p2 will be able to derive f2 after p1 derives f1 and reveals this to p2. Is this process safe, or might p2 learn something about the truth of f0 through inference, in contradiction to the confidentiality policy? Conversely, suppose that p0 is willing to reveal f0 to p2 but not p1. Pairwise policy enforcement will not allow any derivations to go through; however, a distributed cryptographic protocol developed by Minami and Kotz [14] will allow p2 to derive f2, while keeping p1 in the dark, by sending part of the proof in an encrypted form. Even though no obvious violations of confidentiality policies, how can we know whether this approach is safe?
To answer these questions, we develop a new definition of confidentiality that models the global properties of the system-rather than just local interactions-and captures not only direct revelation of knowledge between principals, but also inferences that can be drawn. Our definition is based on the concept of nondeducibility articulated by Sutherland in [15] . Informally, this states that a principal is unable to infer the value of a confidential fact when, given her partial view of the system, there exists one possible valid configuration of the remainder of the system in which the fact in question is true, and another in which the fact is false. We extend this simple definition to capture inferences that can be drawn across the relationships between the values of several confidential facts, and to take into account potential collusion among malicious parties.
In our analysis, we model a distributed proof system using a proof theory consisting of a set of inference rules for deriving new information. This allows us to abstract away protocol details and focus instead on what is provable in a distributed system. Analysis based on a proof theory gives us insights into the "ideal" functionality of the proof system, and allows us to establish a theoretical upper bound for what can be derived using any safe distributed proof system. In exploring this problem, we make the following contributions:
1. We develop formal definitions of confidentiality and safety for distributed proof systems based on the notion of nondeducibility. 2. We present a safety analysis demonstrating the existence of a safe distributed proof system that derives more logical statements than a system that simply enforces confidentiality policies locally. 3. We further describe an unsafe result for a proof system that supports commutative encryption, which shows the effectiveness of our theoretical framework for safety analysis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce a reference model for distributed proof systems parameterized by a set of inference rules in Section 2. We introduce our attack model and develop a formal definition of safety that considers inference attacks by malicious colluding principals in Section 3. We analyze several different confidentialitypreserving proof systems in Section 4. We discuss related work in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.
SYSTEM MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
In this section, we first describe the system model in which we will study distributed proof construction. We then show how systems for enforcing disclosure policies placed on sensitive facts can be represented as sets of inference rules augmenting the base logical framework. Finally, we introduce a computational model based on a trusted third party, which provides us with a theoretical framework for defining the formal notion of safety used throughout the rest of the paper.
System Environment
Many existing distributed proof systems use Datalog to define their semantics (e.g., Delegation logic [12] , DKAL [8] , SD3 [9] , SecPAL, and Gray [2] ). As such, we treat Datalog as our underlying logical language. We assume a distributed system consisting of a set P of principals, each of whom autonomously maintains a Datalog knowledge base containing sets of facts, quoted facts, and rules. A fact is a predicate symbol followed by zero or more terms, where each term is either a lower-case or numerical constant, or a variable (denoted by an upper-case letter). For example, the fact location(alice, 1120) indicates that Alice is currently located in room 1120. Quoted facts are used to represent knowledge derived by other principals in the system, and make use of the says modal operator. For example, the quoted fact (hr says grad (bob)) indicates that Bob is a graduate student (i.e., grad (bob)) according to the knowledge base maintained by the human resource department (i.e., hr ). We denote the sets of facts and quoted facts by using the symbols F and Q = P × F , respectively.
Datalog rules are clauses of the form f ← qi, . . . , qn in which f is a fact and each qi is a quoted fact. These rules allow a principal to derive new facts based upon facts in her knowledge base and the knowledge bases of others. For example, consider the following rule:
This rule states that any user U can access the database db if U is assigned to the "doctor" role and the location service (i.e., ls) indicates that U is located in the hospital. Since any fact fi in the knowledge base of principal pi can trivially be represented as the quoted fact (pi says fi), we denote the set of all Datalog rules as R ⊆ F ×2 Q . We assume that the rules contained in a principal's knowledge base are private, and that facts are only exchanged in accordance with the rules set forth by the specific proof construction approach (see Section 2.2). Finally, to ensure that principals can securely exchange quoted facts, we assume that any two principals pi, pj ∈ P can establish a private and authenticated communication channel between them by using a PKI or some other key distribution channel.
Inference Rules
We model the specifics of a distributed proof system as a collection of inference rules for deriving new facts in each principal's knowledge base. Inference rules are meta-rules that are independent of any particular Datalog rules stored in the knowledge bases, and describe a syntactic mapping from given Datalog rules and facts into new facts to be derived. In standard Datalog, the Elementary Production Principle (EPP) is the only inference rule for deriving new facts [5] :
fn f0
According to the (EPP) rule, if there is a rule f0 ← f1, . . . , fn and every fact fi in the body of the rule exists, then f0 will be derived.
In a distributed setting, inference rules need to explicitly account for facts being managed in many knowledge bases. In the most basic distributed Datalog system, all facts are shared freely between principals as indicated in Figure 1 . The inference rule (COND) allows each principal pi to locally apply the Datalog (EPP) rule to derive a new fact f in its knowledge base KB i. Note that a rule in the premise of (COND) contains quoted facts q1, . . . , qn in its body, thus pi can derive a new fact from statements made by remote principals. The inference rule (SAYS) allows a principal pj to import a quoted fact (pi says f ) into its knowledge base KB j if principal pi maintains a fact f in its knowledge base KB i. We denote this reference proof system as D [IS] , signifying that it represents a basic Datalog system augmented by distributed inference rules IS = {(COND), (SAYS)}. We will use D[IS] as a point of comparison when evaluating other confidentiality-preserving distributed proof systems later in the paper. The confidentiality-preserving distributed proof systems in Section 4 will replace the inference rule (SAYS) with a rule with additional conditions to satisfy confidentiality policies of the principals in a system.
Computation with a Trusted Third Party
A distributed proof system D[I] updates a set of knowledge bases KB by deriving new facts or quoted facts using inference rules in set I iteratively in a bottom-up way. In this paper, we are interested primarily in what is provable at the final state of a distributed proof system-i.e., once all possible inference have been made-as this gives us a theoretical upper bound on what the system can prove, regardless of the communication and implementation details of the system itself. To this end, we adopt a system model that abstracts away these details as shown in Figure 2 . In this model, a trusted third party (TTP) collects the set of initial knowledge bases KB from the principals, simulates the execution of the original proof system D[I] using the inference rules I, and returns to each principal pi a knowledge base KB i representing its final state.
To define the behavior of the system D precisely, we introduce the immediate consequence operators TI,i and TI , as follows:
The function TI,i takes a set of knowledge bases KB as input and outputs a principal pi's knowledge base at the next step. This is accomplished by applying the infer function, which takes a set of knowledge bases KB and a set of inference rules I as inputs and outputs a set S of tuples of the form (q, pi) if principal pi derives a quoted fact q (i.e., q ∈ KB i) in one step by applying an inference rule in I to rules and facts in the KB . The immediate consequence operator TI extends this notion to the knowledge bases of all principals in the obvious way. A distributed proof system D[I] can thus be represented as a state transition system in which states are represented by sets of knowledge bases, and transitions are entailed by the immediate consequence operator TI . In Datalog, this state transition system is guaranteed to reach a fixpoint in which no new facts can be derived using the inference rules I, namely the least Herbrand model for the given rules and facts [5] . Therefore, our reference proof system D[IS] will always have a fixpoint for all possible initial states of its knowledge bases KB , as quoted facts in a distributed proof system can be converted easily into ordinary Datalog facts, which take a principal identity as an additional parameter. We are now able to define the TTP representation of a distributed proof system as follows: In the remainder of this article, we study the safety of distributed proof systems using this TTP model. Although such a TTP could be simulated using secure multi-party computation techniques [7] , this is not our intention. Rather, we use this construction to reason about the theoretical upper bounds on safety and provability that can attained in the distributed proof construction setting. This can then be used as a target for system designers interested in building efficient, yet secure, distributed proof systems.
Soundness
In this paper, we consider a class of distributed proof systems that have the same model semantics as defined by the function fixpoint[IS].
However, since each distributed proof system may be described by a different set of inference rules, the facts that are provable from some initial knowledge base may differ from system to system. We now formally define the notion of provability.
Definition 3 (Proof). Consider a distributed proof system D[I]
with a set of initial knowledge bases KB . Let Φ be a finite sequence < φ1, φ2, . . . , φn > of formulas of the form (c ∈ KB i) where c is a Datalog clause including quoted facts or a confidentiality policy 3 . We say that sequence Φ is a proof for φn if for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, either 1. φi holds in KB , or 2. There is an inference rule
Definition 4 ( ,Provable). When there is a proof Φ for a formula φ in system D[I] with an initial set of knowledge bases KB , we say (I, KB ) φ, or KB φ if a set of inference rules I is clear from the context.
In our reference system D[IS]
, what is provable is equal to the fixpoint produced by the function
In a confidentiality-preserving distributed proof system, confidentiality restrictions may prevent some facts from being provable. However, we require that every distributed proof system must satisfy the soundness requirement below.
Definition 5 (Soundness
In short, any fact that can be derived by a sound distributed proof system must also be derivable in the system D[IS], which does not enforce any notion of access control on the facts in principals' knowledge bases.
SAFETY IN DISTRIBUTED PROVING
In this section, we define the notion of safety for distributed proof systems that support confidentiality policies to protect each principal's confidential facts from other unauthorized principals. We first describe an attacker model for distributed proof systems, and then define the safety of those systems based on the notion of nondeducibility.
Attack Model
A distributed proof system D[I] consists of a finite set of principals P , and we consider attacks on a system from a finite set of malicious and colluding principals A ⊂ P. The malicious principals in A try to infer the truth of confidential facts maintained by non-malicious principals in P \ A by freely sharing information they learn through a execution of a system.
We represent the confidentiality policy as an access control list stored inside the knowledge base of each principal: a principal pj is authorized to learn fact f from pi if release(pj, f ) ∈ KB i. Correspondingly, we say that a fact f in principal pi's knowledge base is confidential with respect to a set of principals A if there is not pj such that release(pj, f ) ∈ KB i. For notational convenience, we say a quoted fact (pi says f ) is confidential if fact f at pi's knowledge base KB i is confidential.
We assume that malicious principals in A have full control over their own knowledge bases; due to the use of the TTP model described in Section 2.1, they cannot actively affect the computation of a distributed proof system in any 3 We will introduce confidentiality policies in Section 3.1. other way. We also assume that the rules in each principal's knowledge base are private, and that there is no direct way for one principal to learn rules defined by other principals. However, each principal pi may be able to learn whether a policy release(pi, f ) belongs to another principal pj's knowledge base KB j (e.g., by requesting access to f ).
We assume that the sets of principals P and inference rules I parameterizing the system D are public knowledge. Thus, a malicious principal can compute the final state of a distributed proof system from any given (potentially guessed) initial configuration of the system. The malicious principals can iterate this process with different initial configurations frequently as they wish to perform inference attacks. We next give a formal definition of safety in a distributed proof system preventing inference attacks performed by malicious principals.
Safety Definition
We develop a formal definition of safety for distributed proof systems based on the concept of nondeducibility introduced by Sutherland [15] . Sutherland modeled inferences by considering the set of all possible "worlds" W-i.e., configurations of the system-and introduced the notion of an information function that represents a certain view of the system. That is, all the information about a given world w ∈ W is provided as the outputs of information functions that operate on w.
Sutherland describes information flows from function v1 : W → X to v2 : W → Y as follows. For some world w, given x = v1(w), we can deduce that w belongs to a set of worlds S ⊆ W where S = {w | w ∈ W, v(w ) = x}. If there is no world w ∈ S such that v2(w ) = y for some y ∈ Y , then we can eliminate the possibility that v2(w) = y, and we thus learn the information on v2(w) from v1(w). Sutherland's nondeducibility in Definition 6 prohibits such information flow from function v1 to v2, as illustrated in Figure 3 .
Definition 6 (Nondeducibility). Given two information functions, v1 : W → X and v2 : W → Y , we say that no information flows from v1 to v2 if for every world w ∈ W, and for y ∈ Y , there exists w ∈ W such that v1(w) = v1(w ) and y = v2(w ).
We apply this definition to a distributed proof system to define its safety with respect to a set of malicious principals A described in Section 3.1. We define a set of worlds W, and two information functions v1 and v2 in the following way. Given a distributed proof system D[I], a world w ∈ W corresponds to an initial set of the knowledge bases KB ∈ KB | P|.
We define the function v1 to represent the knowledge that is learned by a set of malicious principals in A through an execution of system D[I]. We denote by KB * a set of final knowledge bases that system D[I] computes from a given initial set of knowledge bases KB ; that is,
We apply the same notation to the final knowledge bases KB * and denote by KB * i a principal pi's final knowledge base. We now define the function v1, which captures the knowledge of principals in set A, as follows:
The function v1 outputs a set of pairs of the initial and final set of knowledge bases maintained by the principals in set A. We assume that the pairs in the set are ordered based on their principal IDs.
Before introducing the function v2, we define a set of confidential quoted facts in system D[I] as follows:
We define the set of confidential quoted facts CF (KB ) with respect to a set of principals A as follows:
The function v2 below outputs a set of confidential quoted facts that are actually stored in the knowledge bases KB . Definition 9. We define function v2 : KB |P | → 2 Q such that:
We now use the functions v1 and v2 to define the safety of a distributed proof system D[I] using the notion of nondeducibility from Definition 6.
Definition 10 (Safety). We say that a distributed proof system D[I] is safe if for every set of knowledge bases KB ∈ KB |P | , for every finite set of principals A ⊂ P , for every finite set of quoted facts Q ⊆ CF (KB ), there exists another set of knowledge bases KB such that:
1. v1(KB ) = v1(KB ), and
The first condition above requires a set of malicious principals A to obtain the same initial and final states regardless of with which initial state the system starts. The second condition requires that an alternate configuration could have any subset of confidential quoted facts in the final states of the alternate system. Note that we consider protecting the truth of confidential facts in the final state because it implies protecting their truth in the initial state as well.
In the next section, we consider several different distributed proof systems and show how we analyze the safety of those systems based on the safety in Definition 10.
SAFETY ANALYSIS
We now use our framework to analyze several example confidentiality-preserving distributed proof systems to determine whether they respect the safety property described in Definition 10. We first examine the DAC system, which enforces confidentiality policies in a pairwise. We next consider two proof systems that support inferences on encrypted logical statements. The Nested Encryption (NE) system models the system defined by Minami and Kotz [14] that uses public-key encryption to encrypt conjunctions of truth values in a nested fashion. We then discuss the Commutative Encryption (CE) system, which uses a commutative encryption scheme where a value can be encrypted to multiple principals who can decrypt it in arbitrary order. We show that the DAC and NE systems are safe, whereas the CE system is not safe despite supporting a seemingly-reasonable cryptographic construction.
DAC System D[IDAC ]
The DAC system enforces each principal's confidentiality policies in the most intuitive way; the system requires that each principal pi's facts are released only to principals who satisfy pi's confidentiality policies. The DAC system derives new facts and quoted facts with the inference rules in Figure 4 . The DAC system uses the same (COND) rule of the reference system D[IS] to allow each principal to derive local facts. However, the (DAC-SAYS) rule, which replaces the (SAYS) rule in IS, requires that pi maintains a confidentiality policy release(pj, f ) in its knowledge base KB i in order for another principal pj to receive quoted fact (pi says f ).
We first show the soundness result of the DAC system. Proposition 1. The DAC system is sound.
Proof. Suppose that the DAC system derives a formula φ with a proof Φ. Let Φ be a reduced version of the sequence Φ with all of the release formulas removed. Then Φ is a proof for φ in the reference proof system D[IS]: any intermediate φi in Φ that is the result of the (COND) rule can be derived by the same rule in D[IS], and any φi that is the result of the (DAC-SAYS) rule can be derived by the (SAYS) rule in D[IS]. Thus, the DAC system satisfies the soundness requirement in Definition 5.
We next prove that the DAC system is safe. We first provide an intuition for why system DDAC is safe. The main observation is that a malicious principal pn in A never directly receives a confidential quoted fact (pi says f ) ∈ CF (KB ). However, it is possible that pn receives a non-confidential quoted fact (pi says f ) derived from f in KB i, as demonstrated in Figure 5 (a). When principal pn derives this quoted fact, pn does not know that the sender principal pi derives fact f using rule f ← f because that rule is private from We now show that DAC system satisfies the safety conditions in Definition 10.
Proof. Given a set of initial knowledge bases KB and a set of confidential quoted facts Q, and a set of malicious principals A, Algorithm 1 computes an alternate set of knowledge bases KB satisfying the safety conditions in Definition 10. Lines 4-6 ensure that every malicious principal Algorithm 1 Compute an alternate configuration KB in the DAC system. 1: % INPUT: KB ∈ KB, Q ∈ 2 Q , A ∈ 2 P 2: % OUTPUT: KB ∈ KB 3: 4: for all pn ∈ A do 5: KB n ← KBn 6: end for 7: for all pi ∈ (P \ A) do 8: KB i ← {release(pj , f )|release(pj , f ) ∈ KBi} 9: end for 10: for all (pi says f ) ∈ Q do 11: if (pi says f ) / ∈ CF (KB) then
12:
for all pn ∈ A such that (pi says f ) ∈ KB * n do 13:
14:
end for 15: else if (pi says f ) ∈ Q then 16: pn has an initial knowledge base KB n , which is same as that in the alternate systems. Lines 7-9 initialize each nonmalicious principal pi's knowledge base KB i to an empty set of facts while maintaining theÂȃoriginal release policies. Lines 10-14 ensure that, if a malicious principal pn derives a quoted fact (pi says f ) in the original KB * n , pn derives the same quoted fact in the alternate system by adding fact f into pi's alternate knowledge base KB i . Since no nonmalicious principal maintains any rule for deriving new facts in the alternate system, pn does not derive any additional quoted facts in the alternate system. Therefore, every malicious principal obtains the same knowledge base as in the original system. Lines 15-17 add fact f into pi's alternate knowledge base KB i if quoted fact (pi says f ) belongs to a
(f, e) ∈ KB i release(pj, f ) ∈ KB i (pi says f, Ej(e)) ∈ KB k Figure 6 : Inference rules INE of the NE system.
given set of quoted facts Q. Since every non-malicious principal pi does not derive any new facts, pi maintains a confidential fact f in KB * i if and only if (pi says f ) ∈ Q. Since KB computed with Algorithm 1 satisfies the two conditions described in Definition 10, the DAC system is safe.
NE System D[INE ]
We next consider the NE system, which abstracts the cryptographic proving protocol developed by Minami and Kotz in [14] . The NE system represents public-key operations by which logical statements (facts or quoted facts) are encrypted in a nested way. In this section, we show that the NE system is sound and safe and that it can derive more facts than the DAC system. The inference rules of the NE system model public key operations performed by the principals of the system, each of which maintains a public/private key pair and also knows other principals' public keys.
In the NE system, we encode a quoted fact in an encrypted form as a tuple (q, e), where q is a quoted fact and e is a ciphertext containing the truth (true or false) of the quoted fact q. We say that a quoted fact q (≡ pi says f ) is true if f ∈ KB i.
4 An encrypted value e is represented by the following grammar in BNF:
where a term Ei(e) represents a data object in which value e is encrypted with principal pi's public key. The grammar shows that the truth of a quoted fact can be encrypted recursively with different principals' keys. For example, we represent a value True encrypted with a principal pi's public key first and with pj's public key next as Ej(Ei(True)). Also, it can be the conjunction of multiple encrypted values (e.g., Ei(True) ∧ Ej(True)).
We now describe the set of inference rules INE for the NE system listed in Figure 6 . The inference rule (ECOND) is similar to the rule (COND) in the DAC system, but it applies a rule to a set of encrypted facts of the form (qi, ei), and derives a new encrypted fact (f, n k=1 e k ); that is, a quoted fact q is true if all the truth values in e1, . . . , en are true. The inference rule (DEC1) represents a principal pi's decryption operation on an encrypted fact. The rule allows principal pi to remove the outermost encryption of Ei(e) in conjunction 4 We can consider that such a tuple is a special form of an atom where we omit a predicate symbol from the ordinary Datalog atom (e.g., enc(q, e)).
Ei(e) ∧ e and produces a new conjunction e ∧ e . The inference rule (DEC2) derives an ordinary quoted fact q from a tuple whose e component is just True. The inference rule (ENC-SAYS) allows a principal pi maintaining an encrypted fact (f, e) to export (pi says f, Ej(e)) to any principal p k if pi maintains a confidentiality policy release(pj, f ).
Example. Consider the NE system with the following initial set of knowledge bases KB .
KB 2 = {f2 ← p0 says f0, p1 says f1, release(p3, f2)}, KB 1 = {f1, release(p3, f1)}, KB 0 = {f0, release(p2, f0)}. Figure 7 shows a proof for p2 says f2 ∈ KB 3. Notice that principal p2, which is not authorized to learn the truth of fact f1 in KB 1 is involved in the construction of the proof. Notice that principal p3 applies the rule (DEC1) twice to decrypt the encrypted value E3(E3(True)), which is encrypted by principals p1 and p2.
we show the soundness result of the NE system below.
Proof. Suppose that (INE , KB ) φ with a proof Φ. We can obtain a proof Φ for the system D[IS] by first removing from Φ formulas regarding confidentiality policies and then replacing every tuple (q, e) in Φ where e contains a value True with q. Note that this effectively converts the inference rules (ECOND) and (ENC-SAYS) into (COND) and (SAYS), respectively, and eliminates the applications of the rules (DEC1) and (DEC2).
We next show that the NE system is safe. We assume that the TTP for the NE system discards all the encrypted facts from the final state of a system. Our approach for our safety proof is similar to that for the DAC system in the sense that if a malicious principal pn derives a quoted fact (pi says f ), then we try to make an alternate indistinguishable proof for ((pi says f ) ∈ KB n), which does not depend on non-malicious principals' confidential facts. In the case of the DAC system, we construct a proof with a single formula (f ∈ KB i) by adding fact f into pi's alternate initial knowledge base KB i . However, we cannot use this simple strategy because a non-malicious principal pi in the NE system might export a quoted fact whose truth value is recursively encrypted with the public keys of malicious principals. Suppose that pi exports an encrypted quoted fact (pi says f, Ej(E k (True))) where pj and p k are malicious principals in set A. The encrypted value in the quoted fact must be first decrypted by principal pj and then by p k . In this process, only p k derives some quoted fact in cleartext. However, if we add fact f into pi's knowledge base, principal pj derives (pi says f ) in KB j , which does not exist in the original system. Therefore, we need to make sure that an alternate proof constructs an encrypted value of the same structure.
We now prove that the NE system is safe by giving a precise procedure for constructing an alternate configuration KB in which the malicious principals derive the exact same set of encrypted quoted facts regardless of the state of confidential facts in the knowledge bases of honest principals.
Proof (Sketch). Given a set of initial knowledge bases KB , a set of confidential quoted facts Q, and a set of malicious principals A, Algorithm 2 computes an alternate set of knowledge bases KB satisfying the safety conditions in Definition 10. This algorithm consists of two parts: the first part converts every proof Φ for (pi says f ) ∈ KB n where pi / ∈ A and pn ∈ A into Φ by modifying only the rules of nonmalicious principals. We ensure that if a proof Φ contains confidential quoted facts, they only appear in the bodies of non-malicious principals' rules in Φ . This property is crucial to eliminate the proof Φ's dependencies on non-malicious principals' confidential facts in the alternate system. The second part further modifies non-malicious principals' rules as we add or remove a confidential quoted fact to satisfy the requirement regarding set Q. We construct an alternate proof Φ equivalent to Φ without introducing any proof that allows a malicious principal to derive quoted facts that do not exist in the original configuration.
We now describe Algorithm 2 in detail. Line 1 initially sets an alternate set of knowledge bases KB to be same as the original KB . Lines 2-7 iteratively combine the chains of rules that could appear in a proof Φ for q ∈ KB n where q is a quoted fact and pn ∈ A, in the original system. Suppose that Φ contains the following subsequence Γ omitting some formulas in Φ.
If we combine the two rules in Γ by replacing quoted fact (pj says fj) in the body of the rule in KB k with the set of quoted facts q 1 , . . . , q p in the body of the rule in KB j , we obtain another subsequence Γ below.
We can obtain an alternate proof Φ by replacing subsequence Γ in Φ with Γ because, in proof Φ, the encryption operation on quoted fact (pj says fj) with principal p k 's public key is immediately followed by the decryption operation with p k 's private key. Thus, these two operations do not leave any effect on the structure of any encrypted value that appears in the formulas following Γ in Φ .
By iterating the operations of modifying non-malicious principals' rule in the while loop, we eventually obtain an alternate proof Φ in which every confidential quoted fact of the form (pi says f ) only appears in the bodies of rules maintained by non-malicious principals satisfying pi's confidentiality policy on fact f ; if a principal pj maintains such a rule, pi should have the policy release(pj, f ) in KB i.
The main observation is that, if a non-malicious principal pi exports an encrypted fact (pi says f, E k (e)) in a proof Φ for q ∈ KB n where pn is a malicious principal, another nonmalicious principal p k must perform a decryption operation on E k (e) before pn derives quoted fact q in KB n; otherwise, pn cannot decrypt encrypted quoted fact (q, e) where e contains E k (e), which is originally produced by pi. This requirement further requires that, if the encrypted value E k (e) is further encrypted with different principals' public keys recursively, the principals possessing the corresponding private keys must perform decryption operations in the reverse order so that p k can can receive the encrypted value E k (e)
Figure 7: Example proof Φ in the NE system. and decrypt it. This condition allows us to keep finding a matching pair of two rules to be combined in Lines 2-3 of the algorithm until we only have a non-malicious p k 's rule whose body contains quoted facts of other non-malicious principals. Lines 8-24 add or remove confidential facts depending on whether they belong to set Q or not. Lines 9-15 cover the case where we remove confidential facts that are derived in the original system but do not belong to set Q. Line 10 removes fact f and all rules for deriving f from pi's knowledge base KB i . Lines 12-13 remove quoted fact (pi says f ) from the body of any rule including that quoted fact as one of the conditions. This operation ensures that a proof Φ in the original system, which relies on fact f in KB i, is not destroyed in the alternate system; we convert Φ into another proof Φ without using formula (f ∈ KB i). As we mention earlier, only non-malicious principals maintain such rules, and thus we only modify non-malicious principals' knowledge bases. Lines 16-23 cover the case where we add confidential facts that are not derived in the original system, but are included in set Q. Line 17 adds fact f into pi's knowledge base KB i , and lines 18-22 remove all the rules that include quoted fact (pi says f ) in its body such that formula (f ∈ KB i ) never be part of a proof for deriving new facts in the alternate system. Since Algorithm 2 ensures that every malicious principal pn derives the same set of encrypted quoted facts in the alternate system by modifying only non-malicious principals' knowledge bases, we conclude that the NE system is safe.
CE System D[ICE ]
The CE system D[ICE ] extends the NE system by supporting commutative encryption, in which a value encrypted using multiple, different public keys in some order can be decrypted using the corresponding private keys in any order. We represent a quoted fact encrypted with a commutative encryption scheme as a tuple (q, S) where set S contains a set of principals whose public keys are used to encrypt a boolean value True. Figure 8 shows the set of inference rules describing the System DCE , which are obtained by modifying inference rules for the NE System ( Figure 6 ) to support the commutative encryption. The inference rule (CECOND) corresponds to the inference rule (ECOND) in the NE System, but the difference is that the derived fact f is associated with the union of all the principals' public keys needed to decrypt quoted facts q1, . . . , qn. The inference rule (CEDEC) alAlgorithm 2 Compute an alternate configuration KB in the NE system. 1: KB ← KB 2: while ∃(r ≡ f k ← q1, . . . , qm, pj says fj ) ∈ KB k such that
5:
. . , qm, q 1 , . . . , q p } 6: end for 7: end while 8: for all q ≡ (pi says f ) such that q ∈ CF (KB) do 9: if q / ∈ Q then 10:
:
if f ∈ KB * i then 13: 
19:
if f / ∈ KB * i then 20:
21:
end if
22:
end for 23: end if 24: end for lows pi to partially decrypt an encrypted quoted fact (q, S) with pi's public key and obtain (q, S \ {i}). If S = {i}, then the quoted fact q is derived into KB i. The inference rule (CE-SAYS) allows principal pi maintaining an encrypted fact (f, S) to export (q, S ∪ {j}) to any principal p k if pi maintains a DEC policy release(pj, f ). The commutative encryption in the CE system is less restrictive than the nested encryption used in the NE system, and, therefore, system DCE allows principals in the system to derive more facts than the NE system does. Unfortunately, the CE system is not safe as we show below. Proof. We now show that the CE system is not safe by giving an example of unsafe derivations. Consider the Figure 8 : Inference rules ICE of the CE system following initial set of knowledge bases KB .
KB 3 = {f3 ← p2 says f2, release(p4, f3)}, KB 2 = {f2 ← p1 says f1, release(p3, f2)}, KB 1 = {f1 ← p0 says f0, release(p4, f1)}, KB 0 = {f0, release(p2, f0)}. Figure 9 shows a proof Φ for (p3 says f3) ∈ KB 4 in the CE system. Suppose that principals p1, p3, and p4 are malicious and in set A and that fact f0 in principal p0's knowledge base KB 0 is confidential with respect to the principals in A. There are two possible ways to construct an alternate proof Φ without using confidential fact f0 in KB 0. One way is to add fact f2 into KB 2. However, this addition allows malicious principal p3 to derive quoted fact (p2 says f2) in KB 3 in Φ , which does not exist in the original system. If we replace p2's confidentiality policy with a new policy release(p4, p0), principal p4 instead derives a quoted fact (p2 says f2) in KB 4, and thus the alternate proof is still distinguishable. The other way is to arrange the following alternate knowledge bases of p0 and p2 so that p2 exports an quoted fact encrypted with p0's public key as in the original proof. KB 2 = {f2 ← p0 says f 0 , release(p3, f2)}, KB 0 = {f 0 , release(p4, f 0 )}.
However, p4 derives a new quoted fact (p0 says f 0 ) in KB 4, and thus the resulting alternate proof is again distinguishable. Since there is no way to construct an indistinguishable alternate proof Φ , we conclude that the CE system is not safe.
RELATED WORK
Distributed proof systems have been studied mainly in the context of distributed authorization systems. Many researchers [1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 13] have proposed new logicbased languages to express security policies based on roles, delegations, and so on. On the other hand, our focus is to study different proof theories of Datalog-based distributed proof systems concerning the confidentiality of logical statements in each principal's knowledge base. Although a few researchers [14, 17, 18] proposed a confidentiality-preserving distributed proof system in which each peer's rules and facts can be private, none of them provides a formal definition of confidentiality considering inferences attacks.
Becker's information flow analysis [3] on the issue of unauthorized inferences in logic-based authorization systems is the closest to our research. However, Becker's security model is weaker than ours in a couple of ways. First, Becker's safety definition is based on the notion of opacity, which ensures that a querier cannot determine the truth of each confidential fact. Our definition, on the other hand, requires that every possible truth assignment to confidential facts is possible from the viewpoint of an adversary. Second, a querier in Becker's model does not participate in the process of constructing a proof for an initial query although the querier is allowed to insert additional policies into the system. An adversary in our model is a set of colluding principals, which participate in the process of constructing proofs. The malicious principals that are not an initial querier can gain knowledge about intermediate results of the proof.
We previously developed a confidentiality-preserving distributed protocol [10] that allows a querier to derive the conjunction of multiple facts in a distributed proof system. Confidentiality policies in that system are more general than those in the current paper in the sense that the release of a fact's truth value can be made contingent upon facts managed by other principals. However, the safety analysis of the protocol based on the TTP model only considers a single construction of a proof for a given query.
Winsborough and Li [16] formally define safety in automatic trust negotiation based on the notion of indistinguishability about the possession of a set of credentials by a negotiating party. Their analysis considers a sequence of messages between two parties while distributed proof systems in this paper could involve more than two principals.
CONCLUSION
We study the safety of distributed proof systems in which each principal of the system protects its logical statements with confidentiality policies. We model distributed proof systems as a set of inference rules controlling the conditions under which facts can be exchanged between disparate knowledge bases. Our safety definition based on the notion of nondeducibility [15] ensures that any give set of malicious principals in the system cannot gain any information on the truth assignment of confidential facts maintained by non-malicious principals.
Our safety analysis shows that the NE system, whose inference rules encode ordinary public-key operations, is safe and proves more facts than the DAC system, which locally enforces confidentiality policies based on two-party communication. Our theoretical framework for safety analysis is effective enough to prove that the CE system, which supports commutative encryption, is unsafe despite supporting a seemingly-useful cryptographic fact derivation scheme.
